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Second Look ¼ Second Chance: Turning the Tide through
NACDL’s Model Second Look Legislation1
Introduction
Our nation has reached a moment of reckoning. Even
before the past year’s groundswell of demonstrations for
racial justice and criminal legal system reform, there was an
emerging bipartisan consensus that America’s astronomi-
cal incarceration rates are unjust and unsustainable.
Growing numbers of politicians, judges, prosecutors, and
broad swaths of the public now recognize that the United
States has locked up too many people for too long, relying
on hyper-punitive criminal laws that disproportionately
impact the poor and people of color.3
It has also become clear that any meaningful effort to
turn the tide of mass incarceration must grapple with the
epidemic of lengthy sentences that has taken hold of the
U.S. prison system in recent decades. Over two million
people are locked up in jails and prisons in the United
States at any given time—making this nation far and away
the world leader in taking away people’s physical freedom.
While many of these individuals are behind bars for only
a short time, the backbone of mass incarceration is people
serving very long sentences—often decades-long and far
longer than they would serve for comparable crimes else-
where in the world.4 At the federal level alone, 53% are
serving sentences of 10 years or more and 30% are serving
sentences of 15 years or more.5
Our national addiction to long sentences is costly. On
average, a state will pay over $30,000 to incarcerate each
person for each year they remain behind bars.6 In many
states, the annual cost per inmate exceeds $50,000.7 These
costs increase dramatically in the later stages of long sen-
tences, when incarcerated individuals require increasingly
expensive medical care and assistance as they age.8 And
beyond the dollars and cents, incalculable social and eco-
nomic costs are suffered by the families and communities
of those who remain imprisoned for so long. Yet a huge
body of research shows that long sentences do not have
corresponding benefits to society.9 If anything, they are
harmful. When people are locked up for decades, their
likelihood of creating a productive life for themselves
diminishes.10 Society as a whole ultimately bears the sub-
stantial monetary and human costs of its decision to ware-
house human beings rather than rehabilitating them.
This report and accompanying model legislation advo-
cates a simple yet powerful step states can take to safely
reduce the number of individuals locked into counter-
productive, lengthy sentences: guaranteeing that every
incarcerated person’s sentence will get a “second look” after
at least a decade in prison. It begins by describing the jus-
tifications for the second look proposal and then explains
why the right to petition for a sentence reduction should
apply to all incarcerated people after 10 years, and periodi-
cally thereafter if warranted. It describes the logistics of
a flexible second look process, setting forth a wide range of
factors judges should consider in assessing whether
a lengthy sentence can appropriately be reduced. It argues
that states implementing this policy should provide a right
to appointed counsel and describes how victims can be
given a voice in second look proceedings. It argues for
appellate review of second look hearings to best promote
consistency and fairness for all incarcerated people. It
concludes by advocating mechanisms for channeling the
resulting savings back into funding the second look process
itself, as well as programs that will help the individuals who
receive a second chance to succeed and become productive
members of society, to the benefit of all.
“Second look” is an idea whose moment has arrived. By
enacting comprehensive legislation like that proposed here,
state governments can position themselves as leaders in
correcting the worst and most counterproductive excesses
of the mass incarceration era, delivering savings to state
budgets, and a second chance to individuals and commu-
nities who have been left behind for too long.
I. Why “Second Look”?
The idea of addressing mass incarceration through
a “second look” procedure has received sustained attention
in recent years. In December 2018, the concept was
endorsed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, offered
through guiding principles rather than fully fledged model
legislation.11 Legislators around the country have since
begun heeding the call;12 most notably, in 2019, Senator
Cory Booker introduced legislation in Congress that would
create federal second look procedures similar to those
NACDL proposes.13 Here, NACDL takes on the work of
crafting workable legislation that legislators who want to be
leaders on this issue can readily adopt in their own states.
This is one brick in a bigger edifice. Society’s emerging
recognition that it has over-used imprisonment is exem-
plified in a wide range of new statutes, rollbacks of man-
datory minimum sentencing regimes, changes to
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sentencing guidelines, and updated charging and plea-
bargaining policies in prosecutors’ offices.14 Changes have
so far been most prevalent at the front end of the criminal
justice process: states have decriminalized certain conduct,
encouraged alternatives to incarceration, or reduced pen-
alties for future offenders.15 But only some of these changes
are retroactive for those already incarcerated, and some
measures provide retroactive relief for only narrow cate-
gories of offenders, such as juveniles, victims of domestic
violence, or those convicted under specific mandatory-
minimum statutes.16 Use of compassionate release, exec-
utive clemency, and other measures that are accessible to all
has been spotty and selective at best.17 As a result, many
people are serving lengthy sentences right now that they
would not receive today, with no effective mechanism to
reward even the most extraordinary strides towards reha-
bilitation they have made over the course of many years
behind bars.
For these individuals, there is a striking absence of any
mechanism for them to get a second chance. That is why
the second look process is now getting such close attention
from scholars and legislators alike—it is a critical backstop
that enhances other efforts to turn around mass incarcer-
ation already underway. By providing an orderly procedure
for all sentences to be revisited after appropriate lengths of
time, the model legislation proposed by NACDL provides
a safe and effective means for legislators to meet the chal-
lenge of the moment.
II. Who Should be Eligible?
Like Senator Cory Booker, who introduced a second look
bill at the federal level, NACDL urges a threshold of ten
years for reconsideration of lengthy sentences of incarcer-
ation (or less than ten years if the prosecutor consents).18
NACDL proposes ten years as the most fair, rational, and
humane threshold for a number of reasons. As a practical
matter, because the right to petition for resentencing vests
upon actual time served and is not reduced by earned good
time, only those people sentenced to lengthy sentences,
likely at least fifteen to twenty years, will be eligible for
a second look.19 Because of this, the higher the threshold is
set, the less likely it will be that people serving onerous
sentences for non-violent offenses will see relief. Each year
above that threshold eliminates more and more people
from the opportunity and diminishes the potential decar-
cerative benefit of any second look scheme
Significantly, under NACDL’s model legislation, second
look sentencing is available to all persons who have served
at least ten years in prison without regard to the nature of
the underlying crime. NACDL advocates against excluding
from second look sentencing, or setting higher thresholds
for, any category of convictions, including crimes of vio-
lence, sex offenses, child abuse, and reckless and negligent
homicide. At the state level, the majority of the incarcerated
population are people serving sentences for violent crimes
and they also comprise the vast majority of prisoners serv-
ing sentences of twenty years or longer.20 If second look
legislation is truly meant to offer an antidote for mass
incarceration, it must not categorically exclude any potential
petitioner based on their underlying crime of conviction. Of
course, that does not mean that the nature of the underlying
conviction is irrelevant to whether the person who receives
a second look will actually be released sooner. As discussed
below, the nature of the offense is one factor that courts
should take into account when making an individualized
assessment whether to grant a sentence reduction.21
A threshold of ten years is also humane. Opportunities
for rehabilitative programming in prisons are limited.22
Ten years is a reasonable period of time to achieve this goal
of sentencing while not eroding an individual’s long-term
prospects for life on the outside. A meaningful opportunity
for reconsideration of one’s sentence that considers the
person’s ongoing work and good behavior is a powerful
incentive to invest in whatever opportunities are afforded
during incarceration, and, crucially, offers hope for the
future. Further, while hundreds of thousands of people
have been serving painfully lengthy sentences imposed
upon them decades ago, theories of sentencing have
evolved, and we have learned more about the limits of
rehabilitation in the carceral setting.23 A threshold of ten
years offers these people immediate hope and provides
a framework going forward that is consistent with these
new understandings.
Importantly, the model legislation permits a reduction
in sentence below any applicable mandatory minimum
sentence. In recent years, society’s attitudes toward these
blunt carceral instruments have changed, leading reform-
minded prosecutors to revamp their charging policies24
and legislatures to rewrite decades old laws to reduce or
eliminate mandatory minimum sentences.25
Finally, ten years signals only the earliest opportunity
to petition for resentencing. Fears that people serving
long sentences will rush to petition as soon as they are
eligible in every case, without regard to how their petition
will measure up in light of the factors to be considered
(including the nature of the crime of conviction), are
unlikely to be realized. It will surely be the case that the
people who present the most compelling argument for
the earliest possible relief will be fairly extraordinary
cases, whether due to a truly exemplary record of
achievement while incarcerated or a palpable sense that
the original sentence was unjustly harsh in light of the
circumstances. It is more likely, especially if people are
afforded counsel as recommended, that eligible people
will weigh when to petition carefully so as to give them-
selves the best chance of success on their first attempt
and to avoid having their petition sent back for periodic
review.26 A ten-year, universally applicable threshold will
offer a meaningful opportunity for release in the most
compelling cases and will offer a powerful incentive to
those serving sentences for the most difficult crimes to
remain steadfast in their rehabilitative efforts in prison,
while eliminating the need for prolonged litigation
around how any categorical exceptions should be applied.
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III. NACDL’s Proposed “Second Look” Process
NACDL’s model legislation proposes a straightforward,
uniform process to ensure that every eligible incarcerated
individual receives a second look at the length of their
sentence. It also balances the petitioners’ interests with
society’s interest in avoiding the costs – economic and
otherwise – of multiple and prolonged revisitations of
sentences, many of which may have been imposed under
deeply painful circumstances.
Critically, NACDL’s model legislation, like the Model
Penal Code drafters, situates the second look authority in
the judiciary. Sentencing is traditionally a judicial function.
To quote Senator Edward Kennedy, sponsor of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act, “[t]he sentencing judge is the person
who commits prison beds, determining who goes to prison
and for how long.”27 Through their engagement in the
underlying case, their review of the sentencing materials,
their capacity to hear testimony and their real-time experi-
ence of the evolution of sentencing practices in their dis-
trict, judges are best situated to conduct an individualized
assessment of penological needs and objectives in an indi-
vidual case. Judges also discharge this role in a public,
transparent manner, with adversarial testing and appellate
review, all of which creates safeguards against arbitrary
decision-making that do not constrain more secretive bod-
ies such as parole boards.28 And their judicial status and the
norms of their profession insulate them – in part at least –
from the political pressures that may sway elected-official
decisionmakers such as governors.29
Moreover, having the same actors handle both initial
sentencing decisions and proceedings under the second-
look safety valve will likely have a valuable educative
function for individual judges, which in turn should yield
systemic benefits over time. As judges participate in periodic
reviews of initial sentencing decisions made by themselves
and their colleagues, and as they inevitably confront cases
where those sentences proved excessive in retrospect (and
others where the sentence still seems justified), those
experiences will provide them a valuable opportunity to
reflect, calibrate their intuitions, and perhaps even recognize
important patterns that would otherwise be missed. This
opportunity could be particularly valuable at the federal level,
where judges serve for many decades and must craft sen-
tences that are “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”
under the circumstances of each case.30
Notably too, NACDL’s proposed process harnesses the
power of a state’s department of corrections to identify
eligible individuals and notify both the potential applicant
and the court system that their time to apply has arrived.31
Corrections departments have sophisticated inmate data
management systems that permit the programming of
such trigger notifications without a significant investment
of human effort.32 By delegating this duty to corrections
departments, the criminal legal system ensures an efficient
mechanism to limit premature applications and avoid the
potential that eligible petitions are never filed because of
incapacity, illness, or lack of education or support.
NACDL proposed process does not require any par-
ticular format for the petition, other than that it be in
writing. By minimizing unnecessary formalities, NACDL
prioritizes substance over form in the review process,
helps ensure that differences in outcome reflect differ-
ences in the underlying merits and not differences in
familiarity with the process or access to counsel, and
reduces the danger that deserving petitioners will remain
incarcerated (costing taxpayers many thousands of dollars
per year) on the basis of mere procedural technicalities.
Courts can of course create forms to ensure that all rel-
evant information is submitted.33 NACDL’s proposed
process grants considerable discretion to the decision-
maker to accept all types of material in support of the
petition, and to order the expansion of the record as
appropriate.
NACDL’s procedures do require that the court hold
a hearing, which can run the gamut from a court con-
ference with parties appearing remotely, to a full-blown
in-person hearing with witness testimony and cross-
examination. NACDL leaves it to the court’s discretion to
decide the parameters of the hearing. NACDL does,
however, oppose a process whereby the “second look”
determination is made entirely through paper submis-
sions. After at least ten years in custody, the dignity
principles underlying the second look proposal dictate
that there be a “face to face” meeting between the incar-
cerated individual and the sentencing court, even if only
virtual, at which the individual’s ten-year or more prog-
ress is assessed.34 At this hearing or thereafter, the judge
must set forth on the record – orally or in writing – the
reasons for the decision on the second look petition in
a way that promotes appellate review.
NACDL proposes that the original sentencing judge,
where available, determine the second look petition.
NACDL’s proposal returns the sentencing issue to the
decision-maker most knowledgeable about the case.
NACDL is mindful of the benefit of a fresh pair of eyes and
the potential reluctance of a judge to second-guess their
prior determination, particularly in districts where they
may be politically vulnerable.35 A robust appellate process
(as described below) nonetheless, would ameliorate exces-
sively frugal applications of the remedy. States and court
systems could also establish advisory panels of judges to
guide and advise the second look sentencing judge.36
Moreover, as noted above, the second look process can
provide judges valuable new insight into the struggles of
prison life and the capacity for transformation within each
offender.37
Finally, because the second look process implicates the
integrity of the criminal legal system and society’s interest
in the fairness of the sentences incarcerated individuals are
serving, NACDL’s legislation provides that a defendant
cannot waive their “second look” rights. This ban on waiv-
ers reduces the risk that prosecutors will use lopsided bar-
gaining power to insulate sentencing decisions from later
review and modification.38
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IV. The Factors “Second Look” Sentencing Courts Should
Consider
At the heart of NACDL’s proposed legislation is a series of
factors that courts must consider when evaluating whether
to grant a sentence reduction. In major part, these factors
echo the factors courts typically evaluate at an initial sen-
tencing—such as the nature of the offense and the offen-
der’s history and personal characteristics.39 Giving these
traditional aspects of sentencing a fresh look will allow the
court to determine whether the factors that drove the orig-
inal sentencing decision have changed with the passage
time. Courts thus get a second opportunity to evaluate
whether a sentence that may have seemed appropriate
when the crime was fresh remains necessary to fulfill the
traditional goals of sentencing, including retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
NACDL’s proposed legislation also recognizes that
additional considerations specific to resentencing may bear
on the courts’ decision-making. For example, it requires
courts evaluating the nature and circumstances of an
offense to consider whether societal attitudes regarding the
seriousness of the offense or the appropriate sentence for it
have evolved over time, and, if so, to account for any such
changes. By enumerating specific considerations like these,
the proposed legislation provides a means to ensure that
sentencing courts consider all potential changes in sen-
tencing practice and policy that could bear on their
decisions.
The specific factors courts must consider when evalu-
ating a second look petition under NACDL’s proposed
legislation are described below.
• Age at time of the offense: Courts should consider
the age of the petitioner when the offense was com-
mitted, including the latest data regarding cognitive
development in adolescence and early adulthood.
With the passage of time, science may provide new
insight into youth decision-making that could bear
on an offender’s culpability.40
• Age at time of the petition: Courts should also con-
sider the petitioner’s current age, given, in particular,
the latest data on recidivism rates among older
individuals. There is a growing body of evidence that
criminal behavior declines as former offenders age
and mature.41 For this reason, NACDL’s proposed
legislation also puts this factor at the forefront of the
analysis for the oldest petitioners, granting a rebut-
table presumption in favor of release to incarcerated
individuals who are over the age of 50 when they
petition (and, like all eligible petitioners, have served
a minimum of ten years).
• Nature of the offense: Courts can and must consider
the offense that led to the imposition of the original
sentence. The proposed legislation also makes clear,
however, that courts must revisit this factor with
fresh eyes, specifically accounting for any changed
societal attitudes about the harmfulness of the
offense or the appropriate sentence for those who
commit it.42 If the crime is one that the public no
longer wishes to criminalize or has decided should
be punished less harshly – such as crimes related to
the possession or sale of marijuana in many states –
courts can and must take account of those evolving
standards.
• Petitioner’s current history and characteristics: Like
all sentencing decisions, evaluation of a second look
petition will take account of the defendant’s history
(including criminal record) and personal character-
istics. NACDL’s proposed legislation ensures that
courts will account for the latest and most accurate
information, including, importantly, any track record
of rehabilitation the defendant has compiled while
incarcerated. Many individuals go to remarkable
lengths while incarcerated to better themselves, seek
out education and vocational training, reflect on their
mistakes, make amends to their victims and com-
munities, help fellow prisoners in crisis, avoid disci-
plinary issues, and mature into wise and centered
human beings ready to face the world.43 If the peti-
tioner has taken such restorative strides, the court can
and must take account of those efforts. Of course, if
the defendant’s disciplinary history or other experi-
ences while incarcerated shows that they are still
prone to violence or are otherwise unreformed, courts
will account for that information as well.
• Petitioner’s role in the original offense: The specific
role the petitioner played in the crime of conviction
remains relevant during the second look process.
NACDL’s proposed legislation specifically requires
courts to consider aspects of the offense that may
benefit from reevaluation with the passage of time.
For instance, society’s views may have evolved on the
need to punish those who had only secondary
involvement in a crime—such as “felony murder”
defendants sentenced under statutes that required
punishing peripheral accomplices as harshly as the
actual killers themselves.44 Or it may become clearer
in retrospect that a defendant’s crime was committed
under duress or related to sexual abuse or domestic
violence inflicted on the defendant at or near the
time of the offense.45
• Input from health care professionals: If information
regarding a petitioner’s physical or mental health is
available, courts must consider how that information
bears on the determination. Up-to-date information
about any psychological or mental health problems
a petitioner may have faced will often be particularly
relevant, especially in light of evolving attitudes
around mental illness and growing recognition that
the mentally ill are often better served through
treatment, not lengthy custodial sentences.46
• Any statement from the victim: As discussed below,
a just and effective second look process must provide
opportunities for victims and their loved ones to have
a voice in any resentencing decision should they
want one. NACDL’s proposed legislation requires
the court to consider any views a victim or their
family may offer regarding the appropriateness of
a sentence reduction, whether in favor or opposed.
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• Whether the original sentence penalized the exercise
of constitutional rights: There is growing recognition
that some sentencing decisions unfairly penalize
criminal defendants for exercising their constitu-
tional right to have the government’s evidence tested
at a trial before a jury of their peers. Indeed, NACDL
spotlighted this issue in a major report published in
2018.47 NACDL’s proposed legislation requires sen-
tencing courts to consider whether a petitioner’s
original sentence was disproportionately longer than
any sentence available upon a guilty plea, thus
reflecting a trial penalty.
• Whether the sentence reflects ineffective assistance
of counsel: NACDL’s proposed legislation requires
courts to consider whether the petitioner lacked
effective assistance of counsel at any stage in the case
leading to the original sentence, whether at trial or in
the plea-bargaining process. It is especially crucial
that courts consider the role of counsel when
a lengthy sentence was the result of a plea bargain.
There is a growing recognition that the American
criminal legal system is often one of negotiated
pleas, and that a defendant’s constitutional right to
effective counsel extends to the realm of plea bar-
gaining. Major precedents issued within the last
decade have clarified the contours of that constitu-
tional right, and the American Bar Association
undertook a comprehensive revision of its rules
regarding counsel’s obligations during plea bar-
gaining in 2015.48 NACDL’s proposed legislation
requires courts to account for these important
developments.
• Any evidence that the petitioner is innocent: It is
a sad reality that in the U.S. criminal legal system,
innocent people are sometimes convicted or plead
guilty to crimes they did not commit. Moreover,
laws intended to assure the finality of criminal
judgments sometimes go too far when applied to
such cases – leaving even those who come forward
with compelling evidence that they have been
wrongly convicted unable to present that evidence
in post-conviction proceedings.49 NACDL’s pro-
posed second look legislation helps to fill that gap.
Requiring sentencing courts to consider such evi-
dence when deciding whether to reduce a sentence
ensures that potential errors can be brought to light
and given due weight.
• Any other relevant information: The list of specific
factors serves to highlight important considerations
and ensure they are not overlooked. But the list is not
exhaustive. NACDL’s proposed legislation expressly
leaves courts free to consider any and all information
that may bear on the propriety of a possible sentence
reduction, and to make appropriate judgments about
how much weight relevant considerations should
receive in each case.
This is a non-exhaustive set of factors, and legislatures,
of course, may supplement with additional considerations.
For example, the release of any individual may be subject to
the findings required by the penal code of the individual
state, which may include an explicit finding that the indi-
vidual does not pose a threat to the community.50
The goals of second look legislation must be to ensure
that every defendant serving a lengthy sentence has the
opportunity for careful, individualized consideration of
whether that sentence continues to be warranted—and that
courts take full advantage of the additional insight that
a decade of new information can provide. Adopting these
factors will ensure that courts effectuate those goals and
reach a fair and just result in each case that comes before
them under the statute.
V. Right to Appointed Counsel
NACDL’s legislation, consistent with the Model Penal Code
(“MPC”) recommendations, includes a provision that the
incarcerated individual has the right to be represented by
counsel in the second look process, and that counsel will be
appointed if the applicant cannot afford one. Counsel is
needed to ensure the most effective and focused presentation
of the relevant issues, avoiding extraneous details, investi-
gating and uncovering relevant ones, and giving voice to the
applicant’s remorse and vision for their future. In particular,
many petitioners will suffer from mental illness or intellectual
disabilities that would prevent them from being able to
meaningfully represent themselves in court.51 And, advocat-
ing for one’s self from a prison is an extraordinarily difficult
task, if not impossible. Inmates simply are not afforded access
to the tools needed to request records, evaluations, court files,
and the myriad of other materials needed to effectively pres-
ent their case. The need for counsel is borne out by studies
examining the efficacy of analogous resentencing and parole
mechanisms which demonstrate that lawyers are crucial – not
just to the success of individual petitions (though they do,
unquestionably achieve better results with the assistance of
counsel), but also to the efficient implementation of an
entirely new resentencing scheme.52
There would be an acute need for assigned counsel
upon implementation of any second look scheme (partic-
ularly in the early years), but a coordinated effort by public
defender offices and courts could ameliorate the pressure.
Over the last several years and in both state and federal
jurisdictions, the passage of criminal legal system reform
measures, rulings by the United States Supreme Court and
state supreme courts that called for constitutional remedi-
ation, and the need to respond to instances of systemic due
process violations in light of state misconduct, have given
rise to other instances where courts and the criminal
defense bar rose to the occasion to ensure people were
represented. These include, for example, crack disparity
reductions, President Obama’s clemency initiative, sys-
tematic reviews of cases in light of drug lab scandals.53 The
ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic also offers models for
how quickly courts and public defense providers can rally to
provide representation to a new cohort of clients who sud-
denly have a new legal remedy for which they can apply.
Where jurisdictions provide for relief, public defense pro-
viders across the country have—with systematic
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organization in many cases and often on a pro bono basis—
raced to assist clients with medical parole and compas-
sionate release applications.
But unlike these scenarios, with second look legislation,
public defense agencies and other public defense providers
will have time to gear up and to advocate for appropriate
funding to meet the needs of clients at implementation and
then develop standards of representation to meet the
ongoing, but inevitably lessening, need. In fact, NACDL’s
proposed legislation recognizes both the opportunity (and
need) for this sort of foresight and planning, by including
a provision that would guarantee that 10% of the savings
from reduced incarceration will be reinvested in imple-
mentation of the second look regime. One natural way to
ensure smooth implementation would be to invest in pro-
vision of counsel where necessary.
VI. The Victim’s Voice
Victims are the most profoundly affected by an incarcerated
person’s actions. As such, in all criminal legal systems,
victims are given a voice in the prosecution process,
including in the sentencing proceeding. It is not only
appropriate that they also have a voice in any resentencing,
but that the potential for this “second look” at the original
sentence to reopen old traumas is minimized.
As proposed by the MPC, NACDL’s model legislation
includes an orderly process to give any victims of the
incarcerated individual’s crime a voice in the second look
process, if they want one. By setting forth clear procedures
to enable their participation – and in particular, ensuring
consultation with immediately affected individuals such as
close family members in homicide cases – the model leg-
islation guarantees those victims who want to weigh in for
or against resentencing that they will have the right to do so.
At the same time, the model legislation leaves the choice
with victims to decide whether and how they want to par-
ticipate, in order to protect victims from the retraumatiza-
tion that can occur when they are forced to participate in
ways that make them uncomfortable.
Thoughtfully implemented, where victims and their
families are receptive, second look resentencing also pre-
sents a rare opportunity to facilitate application of emerging
restorative justice theories and initiatives in some of the
hardest cases. With the passage of time, many victims’
impulse for retribution diminishes. Restorative justice
programs in which offenders are held accountable to their
victims have documented success in reducing post-
traumatic stress disorder.54 NACDL emphasizes that any
participation by victims in a restorative process would be
voluntary. NACDL notes also that the sentencing court has
considerable discretion in deciding the extent of the hear-
ing to be granted to a second look petitioner and can fash-
ion the procedure to protect victims’ well-being.
VII. Consistency and Fairness in Application
An effective second look sentencing regime should include
safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable decision-
making and promote consistency so that like cases are
treated alike. For that reason, NACDL’s proposal includes
a right for both defendants and prosecuting authorities to
appeal resentencing decisions they believe are unlawful or
inappropriate. To ensure robust appellate advocacy, it
extends the right to counsel in the second look process to
the appellate stage.
This appellate review process is critical not only to pro-
mote fairness and consistency,55 but to ensure that the
legislature’s intent in passing second look legislation is
honored. Without appellate review, individual judges may
frustrate the intent of the statute by giving a cursory review
to petitions under this section, failing to take account of the
sentencing factors highlighted above, or denying relief
despite changed circumstances that the legislature would
have considered significant. Although sentencing courts
have considerable discretion to tailor their resentencing
decisions to the unique circumstances of each case, grant-
ing unfettered and unreviewable discretion to individual
judges would risk divergent outcomes and undermine the
perceived fairness and legitimacy of the second look pro-
cess. Allowing panels of appellate judges to review the work
of sentencing courts is thus essential to a just and effective
second look regime.
VIII. Funding the “Second Look” Process
With almost two million people in state custody,56 at an
average annual cost of $30,000 per prison inmate,57
a “second look” sentencing program potentially saves bil-
lions in incarceration costs. For example, NACDL esti-
mated that the commutations secured by Clemency Project
2014 (the pro bono consortium that recruited and trained
volunteers to submit clemency applications to President
Obama) saved over 13,000 years of imprisonment and in
excess of $430 million in incarceration costs.58
The implementation of NACDL’s second look program,
however, is not free of cost. It will utilize already over-
stretched judicial, prosecutorial and public defender
resources at the trial and appellate level. To offset this
increased demand, NACDL proposes a unique reinvestment
provision involving the savings the program generates.
First, NACDL proposes that 10% of the savings realized
by the second look process will be used to fund its imple-
mentation, such as supporting salaries of dedicated
administrative personnel and lawyers, or a general contri-
bution to a court system’s salary costs.
Second, NACDL also proposes investing 25% of the
second look savings in prison-based and community-based
programs to counter recidivism and promote successful re-
entry. As society embraces the drive to decarcerate, the
shortcomings in the re-entry process are becoming pain-
fully clear. From housing to employment to health services
to support in family reunification support, the obstacles
former offenders face are numerous and daunting.59 In
addition, research shows that education in prison is one of
the most meaningful factors in avoiding a return to prison
upon release.60
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Accordingly, NACDL includes in its model legislation
the proposal that a substantial portion of the savings in
incarceration costs be funneled back into the kinds of pro-
grams that will make “second look” resentencing a success.
For too long, ameliorative programs come with lofty pro-
nouncements but little of the currency necessary to realize
them. This legislation aims to redress that balance. Essen-
tially, it demands that legislatures “walk the walk.” These
proposed allocations can be adjusted based on a state’s
particular needs, and based on data developed as a state’s
second look program is implemented and analyzed.
Conclusion
The principle of “finality”—the idea that a criminal sen-
tence should be considered final or settled once all appeals
are concluded—has been described by the Supreme Court
as “essential to the operation of our criminal justice sys-
tem.”61 There are several reasons why the legal system likes
finality. Primarily, finality is believed to promote deter-
rence.62 It saves the government from reopening an old
case where witnesses have passed away and memories
faded, and otherwise saves resources that would be spent
on relitigating past chapters. It is (patronizingly) alleged
that finality promotes rehabilitation by focusing the defen-
dant on the future. And it gives victims closure.
But research has shown that long sentences do not
deter.63 It is more costly to incarcerate people than it is to
release and support them. Moreover, the hope of a reduc-
tion through stellar prison conduct incentivizes rehabilita-
tion.64 Finally, a victim’s need for closure is real and
deserving of respect, but after ten years, broader societal
interests may become more salient.
This report has explained why states should adopt
a “second look” mechanism, despite the long-standing
allure of finality. But perhaps the most powerful reason is
the humanitarian one. Part of being human is the capacity
to make conscious choices, including to adopt new paths in
life, to admit we were wrong, to forgive. When society
consigns prisoners to long sentences – often decades-long
sentences – without recourse, it negates their humanity and
our own. As the drafters of the Model Penal Code
acknowledge, the second look process is an act of humility:
“It would be an error of arrogance and ahistoricism to
believe that the criminal codes and sentencing laws of our
era have been perfected to reflect only timeless values.”65 It
is also an act of humanity— to acknowledge and, where
appropriate, to reward an incarcerated individual’s personal
transformation.
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